New payment model for rural health services in Mongolia.
This article describes experiences in Mongolia in designing and implementing a new method of payment for rural health services. The new method involves using a formula that allocates 65% of available funding on the basis of risk-adjusted capitation, 20% on the basis of asset costs, 10% on the basis of variations in distance-related costs, and 5% on the basis of satisfactory attainment of quality of care targets. Rural populations have inferior health services in most countries, whether rich or poor. Their situation has deteriorated in most transition economies, including Mongolia since 1990. One factor has been the use of inappropriate methods of payment of care providers. Changes in payment methods have therefore been made in most transition economies with mixed success. One factor has been a tendency to over-simplify, for example, to introduce capitation without risk adjustment or to make per case payments that ignored casemix. In 2002, the Mongolian government decided that its crude funding formula for rural health services should be replaced. It had two main components. The first was payment of an annual grant by the local government from its general revenue on the basis of estimated service population, number of inpatient beds, and number of clinical staff. The second was an output-based payment per inpatient day from the National Health Insurance Fund. The model was administratively complicated, and widely believed to be unfair. The two funding agencies were giving conflicting types of financial incentives. Most important, the funding methods gave few incentives or rewards for service improvement. In some respects, the incentives were perverse (such as the encouragement of hospital admission by the National Health Insurance Fund). A new funding model was developed through statistical analysis of data from routine service reports and opinions questionnaires. As noted above, there are components relating to per capita needs for care, capital assets, distance, and quality of care. The risk-adjusted capitation component determines needs classes by use of age, gender, and family income. The model was accepted by all concerned parties, and steps are now being taken to implement it under transitional arrangements. Many of the data used to parameterize the model are inaccurate and will need to be updated in the near future. However, the model is inherently valid, and procedures have been set in place that will ensure accuracy is improved on a continuing basis. An important reason why the government strongly supported implementation was its commitment to implement output-based budgeting across all government sectors. The new model provided a convenient way of applying output-based budgeting to one major component of the health sector.